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TRANSITIVITY, THE SORITES PARADOX, AND
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ABSTRACT. A persistent argument against the transitivity assumption of rational
choice theory postulates a repeatable action that generates a signiﬁcant beneﬁt at the
expense of a negligible cost. No matter how many times the action has been taken, it
therefore seems reasonable for a decision-maker to take the action one more time.
However, matters are so ﬁxed that the costs of taking the action some large number
of times outweigh the beneﬁts. In taking the action some large number of times on
the grounds that the beneﬁts outweigh the costs every time, the decision-maker
therefore reveals intransitive preferences, since once she has taken it this large
number of times, she would prefer to return to the situation in which she had never
taken the action at all. We defend transitivity against two versions of this argument:
one in which it is assumed that taking the action one more time never has any
perceptible cost, and one in which it is assumed that the cost of taking the action,
though (sometimes) perceptible, is so small as to be outweighed at every step by the
signiﬁcant beneﬁt. We argue that the description of the choice situation in the ﬁrst
version involves a contradiction. We also argue that the reasoning used in the second
version is a form of similarity-based decision-making. We argue that when the
consequences of using similarity-based decision-making are brought to light, rational
decision-makers revise their preferences. We also discuss one method that might be
used in performing this revision.
1. INTRODUCTION
A persistent argument against the transitivity assumption of rational
choice theory postulates a repeatable action that generates a signiﬁ-
cant beneﬁt at the expense of a negligible cost. No matter how many
times the action has been taken, it therefore seems reasonable for a
decision-maker to take the action one more time. However, matters
are so ﬁxed that the costs of taking the action some large number of
times outweigh the beneﬁts. In taking the action some large number
of times on the grounds that the beneﬁts outweigh the costs every
time, the decision-maker therefore reveals intransitive preferences,
since once she has taken it this large number of times, she would
prefer to return to the situation in which she had never taken the
action at all.
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A defender of transitivity must insist that the decision-maker has
made a mistake somewhere, and should therefore revise at least one
of her pairwise preferences. This defender should ideally be able to
help with this revision by locating the mistake in either the conception
of the decision situation or in the process of evaluation that leads to
the irrational pairwise preferences. If the mistake lies in the process of
evaluation, then the defender should ideally be able to oﬀer both an
explanation of the mistake, and an alternative procedure by which it
can be avoided.
In this paper, we try to do just this. In Section 2, we discuss a
version of the argument in which it is assumed that taking the action
one more time never has any perceptible costs. Taking Quinn’s (1990)
‘‘Paradox of the Self-Torturer’’ as an example, we argue that the
description of the choice situation supposed in this version of the
argument is mistaken.
In Section 3, we turn to a version of the argument that assumes
that the cost of taking the action, though (sometimes) perceptible, is
so small as to be outweighed at every step by the signiﬁcant beneﬁt.
This version of the argument is advanced by Carlson (1996) in a
revision of Quinn’s paradox. We show that the reasoning used in this
version of the argument is a form of similarity-based decision-making
(see Tversky, 1967, 1977; Rubinstein, 1990, 2003). Real people cer-
tainly reason in this way. However, we argue that the preferences
revealed by this form of decision-making are not fully considered.
That is to say, when the consequences of using similarity-based
decision-making in the cases under discussion are brought to light,
rational decision-makers would revise their preferences. We also
discuss one of many methods that might be used in performing this
revision.
2. IMPERCEPTIBLE DIFFERENCES AND THE SORITES PARADOX
In Quinn’s ‘Paradox of the Self-Torturer’, Alice is strapped to a
conveniently portable machine that administers a continuous electric
current, the strength of which depends on the position of a dial with
1,001 notches, numbered 0–1,000. Alice is ﬁrst allowed as much time
as she likes to experiment freely with the dial, administering shocks of
various intensity to herself to ﬁnd out how she reacts to diﬀerent
settings of the dial. Quinn postulates that the results of her experi-
mentation are as follows: she can tell the diﬀerence between notches
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that are far enough apart, but ﬁnds that she ‘‘cannot feel any
diﬀerence in comfort between adjacent settings’’, because ‘‘we have
made the increments of current too small to make any diﬀerence in
comfort’’. (1990, p. 79 and p. 81.) It is further assumed that the
current has no eﬀects on Alice’s well-being other than the discomfort
it causes.
After experimenting, Alice is oﬀered the following deal. Starting
with the dial at its lowest notch, she may advance the dial one notch
once a week. Each time she advances the dial by one notch, she is
paid $10,000. But she can never reverse the process and return to an
earlier notch. If she eventually ﬁnds the pain hard to bear, she must
nevertheless continue to endure the discomfort for the rest of her life.
Quinn argues that at every notch, Alice appears to have a good
reason to turn the dial, because she feels no worse by turning the dial,
but reaps a substantial ﬁnancial reward. But, so Quinn supposes, the
result of turning the dial to its highest setting is that Alice must suﬀer
a pain so excruciating she would be willing to return all the money
she has earned to return the dial to its lowest setting. She thereby
reveals that her considered preferences are intransitive. However,
Quinn remarks, we cannot simply dismiss Alice’s preferences as
irrational because they are intransitive (1990, p. 80). For, so Quinn
argues, given the description of the choice situation, it seems entirely
natural and appropriate for her to have such preferences. Nonethe-
less, if she proceeds on the basis of her pairwise preferences between
notches, as Quinn believes the standard theory of rational choice tells
her she must, she ends up in a bad situation.
Quinn is wrong to suppose that if Alice had intransitive preferences
in this case, a rational choice theorist would tell her to advance the dial
at each notch. Instead, since the standard theory considers intransitive
preferences irrational, he would advise Alice to reconsider her pref-
erences. Furthermore, we believe Quinn is mistaken to suppose that
Alice will have intransitive preferences for the reason he oﬀers.
To see why, imagine that during her period of experimentation,
Alice asks herself how she feels at each notch and records her
responses, using terms like ‘no discomfort’, ‘just slightly uncomfort-
able, maybe’, ‘mild pain’, ‘great pain’, etc. (see also Arntzenius and
McCarthy, 1997). We will refer to these descriptions of discomfort as
‘levels of discomfort’. If she repeatedly returns to the same notch, or
just records her feelings at regular intervals while at the same notch, it
is possible that on diﬀerent occasions she will feel diﬀerently at the
same notch, due to unknown or random processes in her nervous
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system. In this case, she will represent the information about ‘how a
notch feels’ by a distribution over diﬀerent levels of discomfort. We
will say that two notches ‘feel the same’ or ‘are indistinguishable’ to
Alice when these recorded distributions are identical.
It is clear that on this understanding of ‘feels the same as’ or ‘is
indistinguishable from’, it cannot be true that all adjacent notches feel
the same when she runs through all notches in ascending order. For
the assumption that Alice feels no discomfort at notch 0, together
with the assumption that all adjacent notches feel the same, yields the
conclusion that Alice feels no discomfort at notch 1, and so on for all
notches until notch 1000. This contradicts the assumption that she is
in excruciating pain at that notch. If Alice wishes to maintain the
assumptions about the pain at notch 0 and notch 1000, she therefore
cannot assume that as she runs through all notches in ascending
order, advancing the dial by one notch will never make any diﬀerence
in comfort.
This reasoning is independent of how small we make the incre-
ments in current. This means that for a sequence of this sort, we must
reject the popular idea that there is a ‘‘least-noticeable diﬀerence’’: a
magnitude of physical change so small that human beings always fail
to detect a diﬀerence between situations in which a change smaller
than this magnitude has and hasn’t occurred. This idea was ﬁrst
concisely incorporated into a model of decision-making by Luce
(1956), who argued that ‘‘the imperfect powers of discrimination of
the human mind’’ meant that inequalities in physical states become
recognizable only when they are of suﬃcient magnitude. However,
contrary to what Luce seems to suggest, the fact that we must reject
the existence of least-noticeable diﬀerences for a sequence of changes
of the kind Alice faces when she runs through all notches in ascending
order does not imply that we are attributing to Alice unlimited
capacities of discrimination. For consider a device that registers
charge only in whole kilovolts. If we hooked this device to a machine
that administered a current of varying voltage, started with the dial at
0 and kept increasing the charge by small increments, then at some
point the device will change from registering ‘0 kV’ to registering
‘1 kV’. This implies that there are no just-noticeable diﬀerences in the
sense under discussion for this device, even though its capacities of
discrimination are limited.
Nonetheless, we can accommodate some kinds of indistinguish-
ability that make use of the idea of just-noticeable diﬀerences in our
description of Alice’s situation, and perhaps this is what Luce had
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in mind. One is that Alice might ﬁnd any two adjacent notches
indistinguishable in isolation. By this, we mean that Alice only
compares ‘how it feels at notch n after having experienced notch
nþ 1’ with ‘how it feels at notch nþ 1 after having experienced
notch n’. Two adjacent notches might be indistinguishable in this
way because Alice’s pain experience at a particular notch might
(because of some neurophysiological process that we need not
understand) depend on the current she was exposed to before. Thus,
it might be the case that if the previous current is very diﬀerent, she
experiences the current at notch n in one way, but if it is similar
(i.e. the diﬀerence between them is smaller than the just-noticeable
diﬀerence), she experiences it in another way. To illustrate, suppose
that if it directly follows notch 0, Alice reports at notch 750 that she
feels ‘great pain’ 51% of the time, and ‘very great pain’ 49% of the
time. At notch 751, if it directly follows notch 0, Alice reports that
she feels ‘great pain’ 49% of the time, and ‘very great pain’ 51% of
the time. But if notch 750 follows notch 751, or notch 751 follows
750, she reports ‘great pain’ and ‘very great pain’ exactly half the
time. If these assumptions hold, and if Alice conﬁnes her compar-
ison of the two notches to the information generated by a sequence
of ‘751 after 750’ and ‘750 after 751’, then these two notches will be
indistinguishable to her in isolation.
We can also permit what one might call ‘introspective indis-
tinguishability’. Suppose Alice does not tabulate her experiences
as we supposed, but instead relies only on her memory for the
comparison of her experience at diﬀerent notches. It is conceiv-
able that when Alice is presented with two similar stimuli in
succession, in her memory the ﬁrst stimulus always becomes
assimilated to the second, so that she ﬁnds them introspectively
indistinguishable.
These forms of indistinguishability rely on contextual dependence
of perception or inconstancy in our memory. In this, we follow some
recent discussions of phenomenal sorites (see Raﬀman, 1994; Regan,
2000; Graﬀ, 2001; Mills, 2001). Some of the attraction of the idea of
indistinguishability may simply lie in the fact that if the number of
notches is far larger than the number of levels of discomfort that can
be experienced over the same range of current, then Alice may well
ﬁnd that neighbouring notches often feel the same. However, we
suggest that its attractiveness may also have something to do with a
tendency to focus on isolated pairwise comparison, or introspective
comparison when imagining Alice’s case.
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Both forms of indistinguishability are compatible with the fact
that as she runs through the entire sequence of notches in ascending
order from 0 to 1000, the probability of Alice experiencing a certain
level of discomfort changes. For that notch 750 and 751 are
indistinguishable in isolation does not mean that the probability
that Alice will experience any given kind of discomfort remains
unchanged when she moves from the distribution associated with
‘notch 750 after notch 749’ to the distribution associated with
‘notch 751 after notch 750’ by turning the dial from notch 750 (after
notch 749) to notch 751. Nor would the fact that Alice’s memory
always deceives her into thinking she felt the same at notch 750 as
she feels now at notch 751 entail that she always did feel the same.
With this in mind, we suggest Alice will interpret the data gener-
ated by her limited period of experimentation as follows. Alice will
see each notch as characterized by a probability distribution over
diﬀerent levels of discomfort and by a monetary prize (see Arntzenius
and McCarthy, 1997). This probability distribution will be her esti-
mate of the probability that at any given time she will experience a
particular level of discomfort while at that notch, given the previous
notch she was exposed to.
For example, suppose at notch 10 she will have $100,000 and that
the probabilities she attaches to being at level of discomfort 0 (‘no
discomfort’) and 1 (‘slight discomfort’) at any given time are 0.82,
and 0.18, respectively. At notch 11 she will have $110,000, while the
respective probabilities are 0.81 and 0.19 (see Table I). (These
probabilities can be made conditional on the previous notch Alice
was exposed to. For simplicity, we leave this aside in what follows,
but the probabilities we discuss for any notch n can be seen as con-
ditional on experiencing that notch after being at notch n 1, so that
they represent the probabilities that Alice faces when she goes
through the notches in ascending order from 0 to 1000.) She will then
TABLE I
A hypothetical representation of notches 10 and 11
Money Notch 10 Notch 11
$100,000 $110,000
Expected pain
Probability of level
of discomfort 0
0.82 0.81
Probability of level
of discomfort 1
0.18 0.19
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determine her preference between notch 10 and 11 by asking herself
whether, starting from the situation at notch 10, it is worth increasing
the likelihood of being in state 1 at any point in time by 1% to get an
extra $10,000.
In sum, since the probability distribution over levels of pain must
diﬀer from its predecessor for at least one notch as Alice runs through
notch 0–1000 in sequence, the ‘imperceptible diﬀerence’ argument
collapses.
3. SIMILARITY-BASED DECISION-MAKING AND A REVISED VERSION OF
QUINN’S PARADOX
There is, however, a revised version of Quinn’s paradox in which
Alice is supposed to reason as follows: ‘‘Even if some adjacent
settings are diﬀerent in terms of expected discomfort, the increase in
expected discomfort is at most only very slight. But having an extra
$10,000 is a great beneﬁt. So I should increase the setting by one’’.
(See Carlson, 1996; Arntzenius and McCarthy, 1997, p. 138.)1
Nonetheless, the combined eﬀect of all the increases in discomfort is
assumed to outweigh the total amount of money to be gained.
The form of decision-making that Alice is applying in this case is
what Tversky (1969, 1977) and Rubinstein (1990, 2003) have called
‘‘similarity-based decision-making’’. Tversky and Rubinstein
hypothesize that people use this form of decision-making to simplify
their choice between multidimensional alternatives. Rubinstein’s
characterization of this form of decision-making is as follows. When
deciding between multi-dimensional alternatives, say bundles of
(expected) pain and money ðpi;miÞ and ðpj;mjÞ, a decision-maker goes
through the following three-stage procedure.
Stage 1: The decision-maker looks for dominance. If pi < pj and
mi > mj, then bundle ðpi;miÞ is preferred over bundle ðpj;mjÞ.
Stage 2: The decision-maker looks for similarities between pi and
pj and between mi and mj. If she ﬁnds similarity in one dimension
only, she disregards this dimension, and determines her preference
between the two pairs using only the dimension in which there is no
similarity. For example, if pi is similar to pj but mi is not similar to mj,
and mj > mi, then bundle ðpj;mjÞ is preferred over bundle ðpi;miÞ.
Stage 3: If the ﬁrst two stages were not decisive, the choice is made
using a diﬀerent criterion.
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Tversky and Rubinstein ﬁnd evidence supporting the hypothesis
that people make decisions in this way in a variety of experiments
involving gambles (with probability and prizes as dimensions of the
alternatives), the choice of applicants (where the dimensions were
taken to be ‘intellectual ability’, ‘emotional stability’ and ‘social
facility’), and intertemporal tradeoﬀs (where the dimensions were
time and money). They also demonstrate that this decision-making
procedure can easily generate intransitive preference orderings.2
Indeed, Tversky systematically managed to get subjects who used
similarity-based decision-making to reveal intransitive preferences by
presenting them with a sequence of pairwise choices between multi-
dimensional alternatives, in which each member of the sequence
diﬀered very little from its predecessor along the ﬁrst dimension, but
diﬀered signiﬁcantly from its predecessor along at least one other
dimension. The ﬁrst dimension was chosen so as to be generally
‘‘more important’’ than the other dimensions, at least when the
diﬀerence between alternatives along this dimension was signiﬁcant.
In choices between neighbouring pairs in the sequence, subjects made
the non-similar dimension or dimensions decisive. However, in
choices between the ﬁrst and last members of the sequence, there were
no similarities along any dimensions, and the diﬀerence between these
alternatives along the ﬁrst dimension became the decisive factor. In
cases where subsequent members of the sequence got slightly better
along the ﬁrst dimension, but signiﬁcantly worse along the other
dimension or dimensions, this led to earlier members of the sequence
being preferred to their neighbours in the sequence in pairwise
comparison, but the last member of the sequence being preferred to
the ﬁrst, generating an intransitive ordering.
We can illustrate this pattern of choice by the following example,
adapted from Tversky (1967, p. 32). Consider a situation in which
three alternatives, x, y, and z, vary along two dimensions, I and II, as
depicted in Table II.
TABLE II
A payoﬀ matrix that can generate intransitive preferences
Alternatives Dimensions
I II
x 2e 6e
y 3e 4e
z 4e 2e
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The alternatives might be job applicants varying in intelligence (I)
and experience (II), where the entries are the candidates’ scores on the
corresponding dimensions. Suppose the subject uses the similarity-
based procedure deﬁned above to choose between each pair of
alternatives, where two alternatives are judged to be similar along a
dimension if the diﬀerence between the alternatives’ scores on that
dimension is less or equal to . Suppose further that Stage 3 of this
procedure is as follows: if the ﬁrst two stages were not decisive,
choose the alternative with the highest score on Dimension I. Since x
and y and y and z are similar along the ﬁrst dimension, the choice is
made on the second dimension, and the subject chooses x over y and
y over z. But since there is no similarity between x and z, the subject
moves to Stage 3 to decide between them and chooses z over x,
revealing an intransitive chain of preferences.
It is easy to see how Alice’s reasoning in the revised version of
Quinn’s paradox ﬁts this procedure. In comparing two adjacent
notches, Alice is hypothesized to always regard the expected pain as
‘similar’, and the money as ‘not similar’. (For example, in the
hypothetical case described in Table I, Alice would regard the pain
represented by the probabilities (82; 18) and (81; 19) over pain levels
(0; 1) as similar, and the amounts $100,000 and $110,000 as dissim-
ilar).3 In accordance with Stage 2 of the procedure, she opts for the
latter of the two notches. However, the expected pain, which is sys-
tematically disregarded in pairwise comparisons between adjacent
notches, emerges as a signiﬁcant and decisive factor when the ﬁrst
and last notches are compared with each other.
What are we to make of the intransitivities so generated? Is this
behaviour necessarily irrational? Similarity-based decision-making
yields an orderly and recognizable way of decision-making. It also
simpliﬁes decision-making in several ways. Firstly, it focuses on dif-
ferences rather than absolute values. This makes it compatible with
what has been called a basic principle of perception and judgement:
we are better attuned to the evaluation of changes or diﬀerences than
to the evaluation of absolute magnitudes (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979). Second, if one alternative is slightly better than another along
all relevant dimensions, it will be immediately apparent in intradi-
mensional comparison and the choice will be easy. By contrast, if the
alternatives are ﬁrst evaluated independently as a whole, this domi-
nance relation might be obscured, and the decision would in any case
be made only after the possibly complex ‘total evaluation’ of the
alternatives (Tversky, 1967, p. 42). Finally, by placing intradimen-
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sional evaluation (in Stages 1 and 2) before the possible use of in-
terdimensional evaluation (in Stage 3), the procedure makes use of
the fact that intradimensional evaluation is simpler, because the
compared quantities are expressed in the same units (Tversky, 1967,
p. 43). For example, when Alice applies the procedure to the com-
parison of adjacent notches, if she judges the expected pain at
neighbouring notches to be similar, and the money at neighbouring
notches to be dissimilar, she never really has to ask herself whether
$10,000 is worth the possible extra discomfort. She simply compares
pain with pain, and money with money. The procedure’s prevalence
can therefore be explained by its saving on decision-making costs and
by the fact that people do not know that it may lead to violations of
transitivity, because most environments in which it is applied are not
designed to take advantage of its weaknesses. Similarity-based deci-
sion-making cannot, therefore, be dismissed out of hand as irrational
in all decision-making environments.
Nonetheless, in environments that are designed to take advantage
of the procedure’s tendency to generate intransitive preferences, like
Alice’s imagined situation, it is a mistake to employ it so long as an
alternative method which yields reliable, transitive orderings is
available, and the costs of employing this method are not prohibitive.
Alice has good reason to regard her initial ordering as mistaken, since
in addition to the familiar problems that intransitive orderings gen-
erate, she will end up badly by adhering to it. And she has another
reason to regard her initial ordering with suspicion: it will not be
stable across diﬀerent descriptions of the same decision problem.
(This means she will violate what Kahneman and Tversky (1984) call
‘‘the principle of invariance.’’) For imagine that the decision problem
is presented to her as follows. She is asked to consider for each notch
n how much she would need to receive (or be willing to pay) while at
notch 0 to render her indiﬀerent between being at notch n (with its
concomitant probability distribution over levels of pain and its sum
of money) and being at notch 0. To prevent the use of similarity-
based reasoning, she is asked to perform this evaluation in an order
that ensures that each notch she is comparing to her ‘baseline’ of
notch 0 is suﬃciently diﬀerent from the previous notch she compared
to notch 0. A notch n is then better than another notch k if Alice
would need to receive more (or pay less) while at notch 0 to render
her indiﬀerent between staying at notch 0 and switching to notch n
than she would need to render her indiﬀerent between staying at
notch 0 and switching to notch k. For example, suppose that Alice
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would have to receive $60,000 to make her indiﬀerent between
staying at notch 0 and moving to notch 11, at which she receives
$110,000 and faces a probability of experiencing no discomfort of
0.81 and of ‘slight discomfort’ of 0.19. Suppose further that she
would be willing to pay at most $50,000 to stay at notch 0 rather than
move to notch 749, at which she receives $7,490,000 and has a
probability of being in ‘great pain’ of 0.51 and of being in ‘very great
pain’ of 0.49. Then notch 11 is better than notch 749. The best notch
is the notch for which she would need to receive the highest amount
to render her indiﬀerent between staying at notch 0 and switching to
that notch.4 Since this method assigns a numerical value to each
notch and hence necessarily respects transitivity, the ordering that
results will be diﬀerent from Alice’s initial ordering.
It will therefore be clear to Alice that her initial pairwise prefer-
ences are mistaken. People generally share this view: when Tversky’s
experimental subjects were told that they had revealed intransitive
preferences, they typically saw themselves as ‘‘having made a mistake
somewhere’’ (Tversky, 1967, p. 40). It may not be clear to them,
however, where they made the mistake or how to correct it. When
presented with the same sequence of pairwise choices a second time,
in full knowledge of the fact that their initial choices generated an
intransitive ordering, they might still feel drawn to choose in the same
way. What is someone to do who accepts the normative force of the
principle of transitivity and the principle of invariance but who is also
drawn to using similarity-based decision-making?
We suggest that such a person should regard her pairwise pref-
erences from the initial choice situation as an artifact of the
arrangement of the alternatives, which led her to systematically
undervalue an important aspect of the alternatives. Instead, she
should determine her preferences by a reliable method that bypasses
Stage 2 of the procedure. One possible method of this kind would be
the one just outlined. Alice could test the reliability of the ordering
elicited by this method by checking whether it agrees with her deci-
sions in other presentations of the same decision problem (excluding,
of course, presentations that would tempt her to employ similarity-
based reasoning). For example, she could check whether it agrees
with her pairwise preferences in a direct choice between notches that
are far enough apart. Thus, to conﬁrm the preference for notch 11
over notch 749 that she found by the indirect method of asking how
much she would need to receive (or pay) while at notch 0 to render
her indiﬀerent between each of these notches and notch 0, she could
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ask herself whether she would prefer notch 11 to notch 749 in a direct
comparison.5 She could also check whether she would arrive at the
same preference ordering no matter which notch she used as a
baseline.6 To illustrate, Alice’s preference for notch 11 over notch 749
with notch 0 as the baseline would be consistent with the preferences
she revealed using notch 1000 as a baseline if she would be indiﬀerent
between, say, getting another $2,000,000 on top of her $10,000,000
while at notch 1000 and moving to notch 11, while she would also be
indiﬀerent between, say, getting another $500,000 on top of her
$10,000,000 while at notch 1000 and moving to notch 749. Notch 11
would then be better than notch 749 when judged from a baseline of
notch 1000, just as it was when judged from a baseline of notch 0.
It may well be that her choices in some of these diﬀerent presen-
tations of the same decision problem will diﬀer. Should there be such
inconsistencies, then Alice should return to those judgement that
diﬀered between diﬀerent presentations and ask herself which of these
judgments she trusts more. This may involve inquiring into the
process of evaluation she is employing under each presentation, and
asking whether it is a process that she thinks is dependable. Some-
times she will come to regard the ordering resulting from a particular
presentation as undependable, as we have proposed she should do
with the ordering elicited by the initial presentation of the decision
situation. By a process of jockeying–making judgments under dif-
ferent presentations, checking their consistency, questioning incon-
sistent judgments and their grounds, discarding orderings resulting
from undependable presentations and methods of evaluation in some
cases, revising her judgments in others, again checking their consis-
tency, etc. – she should ultimately arrive at an ordering that is con-
sistent across diﬀerent (non-misleading) presentations and that
respects transitivity.7
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NOTES
1 Arntzenius and McCarthy believe Alice is mistaken to reason in this way, as do
we. However, they do not oﬀer our diagnosis of the kind of reasoning employed,
nor do they discuss our proposed way in which Alice can revise her preferences.
2 Rubinstein (1990) demonstrates that the use of similarity relations in decision
making over two-dimensional alternatives may be consistent with a transitive
ordering, but only under very restrictive conditions on the type of similarity
relation used and on the criterion used in Step 3 of the procedure. Vila` (1998)
strengthens this result by showing that any attempt to order alternatives of three
or more dimensions using similarity relations will generate intransitivities.
3 As the amount of money Alice has won increases, $10,000 may cease to be a
signiﬁcant diﬀerence. That is, when Alice is comparing notches 990 and 991, she is
comparing prizes of $9,900,000 and $9,910,000. These may also seem similar, if
Alice (sometimes) employs a ratio-similarity relation, rather than an absolute
diﬀerence similarity relation. (For discussion of these types of similarity relations,
see Rubinstein, 1990.) This could be remedied by changing the example so that
Alice gets more money for turning the dial at higher notches.
4 This procedure will not work for notches close to notch 0. Should she have any
reason to think any of these notches might be the best notch, then Alice should
compare the notches close to notch 0 and any other candidates for ‘best notch’
with a notch suﬃciently far removed from all of them. She should then determine
how much she would need to receive to render her indiﬀerent between staying at
that notch and moving to each of the candidate notches.
5 Empirical evidence indicates that the preferences expressed between pairs that are
far enough apart will be transitive. (See Tversky, 1967, pp. 36–37.) Though this
doesn’t imply that the direct pairwise comparison of notches that are far enough
apart will yield the same ordering as our suggested method, it ensures that it is at
least not a foregone conclusion that the two will conﬂict.
6 Keeping in mind the caveat about notches close to the baseline mentioned in
note 4.
7 An example of this process is Savage’s (1972, pp. 101–104) response to a case
proposed by Allais (1953). Allais elicited Savage’s on the spot preferences in two
decision situations each involving two gambles, and showed that his choices in
these situations, taken together, contradicted the postulates of Savage’s theory.
Though he confessed that he was still intuitively attracted to his initial preferences,
Savage revised his preferences by considering a diﬀerent presentation of the same
decision situations which he regarded as superior to the ﬁrst. He saw this proce-
dure as correcting an error in his initial preferences. See also the description of the
process of ‘‘jockeying’’ to arrive at consistent prior subjective estimates of prob-
ability distributions in Luce and Raiﬀa (1957, pp. 299–302).
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